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SMALL-HANDLES, BIG IMPACTS: WHEN SHOULD 
THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT 
REQUIRE AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
STATEMENT? 
Mary K. Fitzgerald* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following hypothetical: a corporation plans to open 
wood-chipping installations throughout the southeastern United States. 
The installations will process trees and vegetation from thousands of 
acres of private forestland. The corporation will transport the wood-
chips by barge and freighter to the eastern United States. The wood-
chipping installations may affect the biological and climatological char-
acter of major portions of several southern states. The only federal 
permit needed by the corporation to go forward with the project is 
an Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) wharf-building permit for the 
barge-loading facility. Without the federal permit, the project will not 
take place. With the federal permit, the project will take place. The 
corporation can argue that since the barge wharf itself is minor, the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)l does not require the 
Corps to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS).2 The 
wood-chipping installation project considered as a whole, however, 
clearly would require an EIS. This situation exemplifies the classic 
"small-handle" problem.3 
* Production Editor, 1995-1996, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
142 u.s.c. §§ 4321-47 (1988). 
2 See infra note 15 and accompanying text. 
3 This hypothetical is taken from ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY 617 (1992). 
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This Comment explores the nature of the small-handle problem.4 
The ultimate question of the small-handle problem is whether an 
agency's initial determination of whether an EIS is necessary requires 
consideration of an entire project or merely of a piece of the project. 
Section II discusses the legislative history of NEPA and the admin-
istrative regulations from which federal agencies seek guidance in 
determining whether or not to prepare an EIS. Section III examines 
the methods various courts utilize in analyzing small-handle problems. 
Section IV examines decisions that employ two different methods of 
analysis in requiring developers to prepare a comprehensive EIS. In 
addition, Section IV examines how using the methods of analysis that 
are more likely to require a comprehensive EIS can help fulfill the 
national policy goals that NEPA established. Finally, this Comment 
concludes that agencies and courts should construe NEPA's EIS re-
quirement to mandate consideration of projects in their entirety. 
II. NEPA: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, THE STATUTE, AND THE 
REGULATORY GUIDELINES 
A. The Legislative History of NEPA 
In January of 1970, President Nixon signed into law the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969.5 The stated purpose of NEPA was 
to establish a comprehensive national environmental policy.6 Congress 
enacted NEPA in response to the growing awareness of the interde-
pendence between people and their environment.7 In recognition of 
this interdependence, Congress was concerned with environmental 
harms resulting from technological advancements,S popUlation growth,9 
and an overall degradation in environmental quality.10 
4 "Small-handle" is a term generally used to refer to instances where the amount of federal 
involvement is arguably marginal, and the issue becomes whether or not a comprehensive EIS 
is required. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION, § 8.04(2) (2d ed. 1992 
(Supp. 1995». 
6 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 4321-47). 
642 U.S.C § 4321. 
7 H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2751, 2753 
(1969). 
8 [d. 
9 S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 5, 13 (1969). 
10 [d. 
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Proponents ofNEPA urged that passage ofNEPA was required to 
avert a national catastropheY Before NEPA, environmental problems 
were addressed only after reaching crisis proportions.12 Senator Henry 
Jackson, (D-Wash.) the chairman of the Senate Interior and Insular 
Affairs Committee,13 however, wanted NEPA to "prevent ... envi-
ronmental abuse and degradation caused by Federal actions before 
they got off the planning board."14 
NEPA mandates that federal agencies prepare a "detailed state-
ment ... on the environmental impact" of any proposed "major Federal 
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."15 
Initially, an agency must determine whether a proposed action trig-
gers the EIS requirement.16 An agency's determination of NEPA 
applicability is subject to judicial review.17 NEPA's legislative history 
does not provide much insight into what constitutes "major Federal 
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."18 
A report to the Senate by the Senate Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs emphasized that Congress intended NEPA to estab-
lish America's broad policy goals with respect to the environment.19 
11 Terence L. Thatcher, Understanding Interdependence in the Natural Environment: Some 
Thoughts on Cumulative Impact Assessment Under the National Environment Policy Act, 20 
ENVTL. L. 611, 612 (1990). 
12 115 CONGo REG. S40,416 (1969). 
13 1969 Congressional Q. Almanac, Volume XXV, Envtl. Qual. Council 525, 525. 
14 115 CONGo REG. S29,055 (1969); see Thatcher, supra note 11, at 612. 
16 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i). 
16 See id. § 4332(2)(C); see also Valerie M. Fogelman, Threshold Determinations Under the 
National Environmental Policy Act, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 59, 60 (1988). 
17 For a complete discussion of judicial review see generally Susannah T. French, Judicial 
Review of the Administrative Record in NEPA Litigation, 81 CAL. L. REV. 929 (1993). 
18 Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group V. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1319 (8th Cir. 1974) 
(referring generally to H.R. REP. No. 378, supra note 7 and S. REP. No. 296, supra note 9). 
19 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 296, supra note 9, at 16. The Senate Report stated that "the unprece-
dented pressures of population and the impact of science and technology make a policy necessary 
today. The expression 'environmental quality' symbolizes the complex and interrelated aspects 
of one man's dependence upon his environment." Id. 
The House Report, submitted to the House of Representatives by the Committee on Mer-
chant Marine and Fisheries also took a broad view of the complex environmental issues. The 
House Report stated that: 
today we are manipulating an extremely complex system: The ecosystems of the earth, 
the units of the landscape, and we do not know the consequences of our actions until 
it is too late. We need to study ecosystems in advance and work out the strategies of 
living with the landscape. 
H.R. REP. No. 378, supra note 7, at 2756. 
'\ 
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NEPNs statutory language establishes broad national policy goalS.20 
In short, the primary purpose of NEPA is to force agencies to con-
sider the environmental impacts of their projects.21 Another purpose 
ofNEPA is to protect the integrity of federal agencies' decision-mak-
ing process and to promote better-informed federal decisionmaking22 
by opening the process up to the public.23 Indeed, regulations promul-
gated under NEPA by the Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ)24 
state that one of the policies of federal agencies must be to "encourage 
and facilitate public involvement in decisions which affect the quality 
of the human environment."25 A final purpose of NEPA is the early 
identification of the environmental consequences of government action 
while understanding those consequences within a larger context.26 
An agency's determination of whether an EIS must be prepared is 
significant for several reasons. First, the EIS process gives interested 
parties an opportunity to voice their concerns about projects in which 
the federal government is playing a part, and to require agencies to 
pay attention to and address these concerns.27 Indeed, a federal agency 
preparing an EIS must obtain comments from other federal agencies 
that have special expertise on any of the proposed project's potential 
environmental impacts.28 The agency preparing the EIS also must 
20 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a). NEPA states: 
[d. 
it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State and 
local governments, and other concerned public and private organizations, to use all 
practicable means and measures, including financial and technical assistance, in a 
manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain 
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the 
social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Ameri-
cans. 
21 See id. § 4331(b). 
22 William B. Ellis & Thrner T. Smith Jr., The Limits of Federal Environmental Responsibility 
and Control Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 18 ENVT. L. REP. 10,055, 10,058 
(1988). 
23 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(b) (1995). The CEQ regulations state that NEPNs "procedures 
must insure [sic] that environmental information is available to public officials and citizens 
before decisions are made and before actions are taken." [d.; see also Ellis & Smith, supra note 
22, at 10,058 (noting that "NEPNs chief goal-promoting better informed decisionmaking-
would seem to favor full disclosure of such significant environmental effects."). 
24 See infra notes 35--38 and accompanying text. 
25 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(d). 
26 Thatcher, supra note 11, at 612. 
27 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1503.1(a)(3)-(4) (1995). 
28 [d. § 1503.1(a)(I). 
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request comments from any federal agency that is authorized to de-
velop and enforce environmental standards.29 In addition, an agency 
must solicit comments from other interested groupS.30 The issue of 
whether or not an agency must prepare an E IS is also significant 
because agency officials might pay less attention to the environmental 
effects of a project if the agency does not prepare an EIS.31 Finally, 
an EIS should supply a cost/benefit analysis of a project, weighing 
project benefits against environmental harms.32 In short, NEPA's EIS 
requirement does not mandate that a project be stopped if the envi-
ronmental consequences of the project are severe.33 Rather, Congress 
designed the EIS process to ensure that a federal agency at least 
consider the environmental consequences of a project and make an 
informed decision about whether or not a project should go forward 
only after weighing all information gathered preparing an EIS.34 
B. Statutory and Regulatory Guidelines under NEPA 
In addition to requiring that federal agencies prepare EISs, NEPA 
also established the CEQ.35 The purpose of the CEQ is to review and 
evaluate federal government programs to determine how the pro-
grams contribute to the furtherance of a national environmental pol-
icy.36 The CEQ also promulgated its own regulations, which provide 
guidance to federal agencies preparing EISs.37 The United States 
Supreme Court has stated that the CEQ regulations are entitled to 
substantial deference.38 
CEQ regulations provide both substantive and procedural guide-
lines for EIS preparation. The substantive guidelines help an 
29 [d. § 1503.1(a)(2)(i). 
30 See id. § 1503.1(a)(2). The CEQ regulations direct that an agency shall request comments 
from Native American groups whose reservations may be affected. [d. § 1503.1(a)(2)(ii). In 
addition, an agency must request comments from other agencies that have requested state-
ments on actions of the kind proposed. [d. § 1503.1(a)(2)(iii). 
31 Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 875 (1st Cir. 1985). 
32 See id. 
33 See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). 
34 See id.; Sierra Club, 769 F.2d at 875. 
35 42 U.S.C. § 4341. 
36 40 C.F.R § 1515.2 (1995). 
37 See id. §§ 15~8 (1995). 
38 Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979) (noting that the CEQ was created by NEPA, 
and NEPA mandated that the CEQ was responsible for reviewing and appraising programs and 
policies of the federal government in light of NEPA's policies). 
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agency determine whether the agency must prepare an EIS.39 For 
instance, the CEQ regulations define several of the terms used 
in NEPA such as "significantly"40 and "major Federal actions."41 In 
addition, the CEQ regulations also establish guidelines for the scope 
of actions, alternatives, and impacts to be considered in an EIS.42 
In assessing the scope of an EIS, the CEQ regulations require 
an agency to consider three types of actions: connected actions,43 cu-
mulative actions,44 and similar actions.45 In addition, an agency pre-
paring an EIS must consider three types of impacts or effects: di-
rect impacts, indirect impacts, and cumulative impacts.46 The CEQ 
39 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-08. 
40 [d. § 1508.27. The CEQ regulations define the use of the term "significantly" to mean 
"considerations of both context and intensity." [d. 
41 [d. § 1508.18. The CEQ regulations define "major Federal actions" to include "actions with 
effects that may be major and which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibil-
ity." [d. The regulations also state that "actions include new and continuing activities, including 
projects and programs entirely or partly financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, or approved 
by federal agencies; new or revised agency rules, regulations, plans, policies, or procedures; and 
legislative proposals." [d. § 1508.1S(a). 
42 [d. § 150S.25. 
43 [d. § 1508.25(a)(1). The CEQ regulations define "connected actions" as actions which are 
"closely related." [d. The regulations go on to explain that: 
actions are connected if they automatically trigger other actions which may require 
environmental impact statements ... cannot or will not proceed unless other actions 
are taken previously, simultaneously, or are interdependent parts of a larger action and 
depend on the larger action for their justification. 
[d. §§ 150S.25(a)(1)(i)-(iii). 
The CEQ regulations also mandate that an EIS consider three types of alternatives. [d. 
§ 150S.25. A discussion of these alternatives is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
44 40 C.F.R § 150S.25(a)(2). An EIS must consider cumulative actions when there are several 
concrete proposals pending before the agency that together potentially impact the environment. 
The Regulations define cumulative actions as actions ''which when viewed with other proposed 
actions have cumulatively significant impacts and should therefore be discussed in the same 
impact statement." [d.; see also Thatcher, supra note 11, at 625. 
45 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(3). Similar actions are actions "which when viewed with other rea-
sonably foreseeable or proposed agency actions, have similarities that provide a basis for 
evaluating their environmental consequencies [sic] together, such as common timing or geogra-
phy." [d. 
46 [d. § 150S.25(c). In assessing one particular proposal, the EIS must consider any anticipated 
impacts from the action as far as reasonably foreseeable in assessing the cumulative impact of 
the proposal. CEQ regulations define "cumulative impact" as "the impact on the environment 
which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and 
reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or 
person undertakes such other actions." [d. § 150S.7. 
The CEQ regulations state that effects and impacts as used in the regulations are synony-
mous. [d. § 150S.S(b). The regulations define direct effects as those that are "caused by the action 
and occur at the same time and place." [d. § 150S.S(a). 
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also has promulgated answers to questions commonly asked about 
NEPA.47 
In addition to providing substantive guidelines, the CEQ regula-
tions delineate the procedural steps an agency should follow when 
determining whether or not to prepare an EIS.48 Initially, a federal 
agency may be required to prepare an environmental assessment 
(EA) of a project.49 The CEQ regulations define an EA as a concise 
document that determines whether or not a more expansive EIS is 
required in light of available evidence and analysis.50 If an agency 
concludes from an EA that no EIS is required, the agency must 
prepare a finding of no significant impact (FONSI).51 If an agency 
determines that an EIS is required, the agency must prepare a pre-
liminary draft EIS.52 Before the final EIS is prepared, however, the 
agency must obtain comments on its draft EIS from certain federal 
agencies and may request comments on its draft EIS from other 
interested parties.53 
Finally, CEQ regulations mandate that federal agencies also prom-
ulgate and comply with their own regulations and procedures to sup-
plement those of the CEQ.54 These internal regulations also provide 
some direction to federal agencies deciding whether or not to prepare 
Indirect effects are: 
caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still 
reasonably foreseeable. Indirect effects may include growth inducing effects and other 
effects related to induced changes in the pattern of land use, population density or 
growth rate, and related effects in air and water and other natural systems, including 
ecosystems. 
[d. § 1508.8(b). 
47 See generally Farly Most Ailked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental 
Policy Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026 (1981). Examples include "[t]o what extent must an 
agency inquire into whether an applicant ... will also need approval from another agency for 
the same proposal or some other related aspect of it?" [d. at 18,029, and "[h]ow should uncer-
tainties about indirect effects of a proposal be addressed ... ?" [d. at 18,031. 
In Sierra Club v. Marsh, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit referred 
to these questions to reject the argument of the Corps that promises to mitigate certain 
environmental impacts in the future means that the impacts are not significant. Sierra Club v. 
Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 875 (1st Cir. 1985). The Sierra Club court also pointed out that the Farly 
Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Regulations, supra, 
directed the Corps to consider the secondary impacts of a proposed project. [d. at 879. 
48 See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4. 
49 [d. § 1501.4(b). 
50 [d. § 1508.9. 
51 [d. § 1501.4(e). 
62 See id. § 1502.9. 
53 See supra notes 28--30 and accompanying text. 
54 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(a). 
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an EIS. Each agency's internal regulations must establish specific 
criteria for typical actions that do not require an EIS, specific criteria 
for typical actions that do require an EIS, and specific criteria for 
typical actions that do require an EA but do not require an EIS.55 
III. JUDICIAL RESOLUTION OF SMALL-HANDLE PROBLEMS 
The majority of courts that have considered a small-handle problem 
have not looked at a project as a whole.56 Rather, these courts have 
looked only at that part of a project which requires a federal permit. 
Consequently, these courts have concluded that the portions of pro-
jects that require federal permits are not "major Federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."57 Thus, 
more often than not, courts have not required a comprehensive EIS 
in small-handle situations.58 A minority of courts, however, guided by 
the legislative history of NEPA and the CEQ regulations, have looked 
at small-handle projects as a whole and have required an EIS for the 
whole project. 59 
A. The First Judicial Approach: Utilizing Either a 
Unitary or a Dual Standard of Analysis 
When first confronted with projects that arguably had minimal 
federal involvement, courts decided whether the phrase "major Fed-
eral actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment" required a dual standard of analysis or a unitary standard of 
analysis.60 The dual standard adopted by some courts involved an 
analysis of both the scope of federal involvement in the project and 
the significance of the project's environmental effects. Thus, federal 
55 [d. § 1507.3(b)(2). 
56 See MANDELKER, supra note 4, § 8.04; see, e.g., Sylvester v. United States Army Corps of 
Engineers,884 F.2d 394, 400-01 (9th Cir. 1989); Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, 621 F.2d 
269, 273 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980); Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States Army 
Corps of Engineers, 610 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980). 
57 See, e.g., Sylvester, 884 F.2d at 400-01; Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, 621 F.2d at 273; Save 
the Bay, 610 F.2d at 326. 
58 See MANDELKER, supra note 4, § 8.04; see, e.g., Sylvester, 884 F.2d at 400-01; Winnebago 
Tribe of Nebraska, 621 F.2d at 273; Save the Bay, 610 F.2d at 327. 
59 Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 881--82 (1st Cir. 1985); Colorado River Indian Tribes v. 
Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1432, 1434 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
60 See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 584 F.2d 619, 626-27 (3d Cir. 1978); City of Davis 
v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673 n.15 (9th Cir. 1975); Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. 
Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1974). 
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involvement had to be major before courts would require an EIS.61 In 
contrast to the dual standard, the unitary standard involved only the 
environmental harm component.62 Courts adopting the unitary stand-
ard assumed that if a federal agency was involved in a project that 
was going to "significantly affect the quality of the human environ-
ment," the federal action should be considered major-"otherwise it 
would be possible to speak of a 'minor' federal action significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment."63 
Courts that adopted the dual standard of analysis relied on tradi-
tional methods of statutory analysis.64 For example, in NAACP v. 
Medical Center, Inc., a medical center that operated three hospitals 
planned to centralize hospital services and relocate much of the hos-
pitals' facilities.65 The medical center was required to receive approval 
from the United States Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare (HEW).66 Opponents of the centralization project charged that 
HEW violated NEPA because HEW issued an approval of a capital 
expenditure for the centralization project without first filing an EIS.67 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that 
the dual standard of analysis was the appropriate approach because 
the dual standard of analysis followed the statutory language of NEPA 
more closely than did the unitary standard.68 The court reasoned that 
to hold otherwise would give no effect to the word "major" in NEPA.69 
The court found that Congress may have concluded that an EIS 
should not be necessary when federal involvement in a project was 
minima1.70 Thus, because mere approval of the capital expenditure was 
61 NAACP, 584 F.2d at 626; see Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 1032-33 (7th Cir. 1972); Hanly 
v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir.), cen. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972). 
62 City of Davis, 521 F.2d at 673 n.15 (noting that because court was adopting unitary standard 
of review, court confined its determination to whether defendants reasonably concluded that 
project would have no significant environmental effects). 
63 Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 498 F.2d at 1321-22. 
64 NAACP, 584 F.2d at 627. 
65 Id. at 623. 
66 Id. The Center sought approval from the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 
pursuant to § 1122 of the Social Security Act. Id. 
67Id. at 624. 
68 Id. at 627. 
69 NAACP, 584 F.2d at 627. 
7°Id. In adopting the dual standard of analysis, the court pointed to the CEQ guidelines that 
recognized separate proof thresholds for "major" and "significant." Id. at 670. A noted NEPA 
commentator has observed that courts like NAACP that adopted the dual standard were 
influenced by earlier CEQ regulations that adopted a dual standard. See MANDELKER, supra 
note 4, § 8.06(2). The CEQ regulations now explicitly state that "[m]ajor reinforces but does not 
have a meaning independent of significantly." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18. 
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not "major" federal action, the court upheld the decision of the United 
States District Court for the District of Delaware that an EIS was 
not required.71 
Reasoning along similar lines, the United States Courts of Appeals 
for the Second72 and Seventh Circuits73 also adopted the dual stand-
ard. It is important to note, however, that in contrast to these courts, 
the CEQ regulations explicitly have adopted the unitary approach.74 
Jurisdictions that had adopted the dual approach were influenced by 
earlier versions of the CEQ regulations that had not adopted explic-
itly the unitary approach and, in general, those jurisdictions have not 
reconsidered their original decisions.75 
In contrast, circuits that adopted a unitary standard of analysis 
relied on the purpose ofNEPA to reach their position.76 In Minnesota 
Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, the plaintiff requested a 
temporary and permanent injunction against logging in Boundary 
Waters Canoe Area (BWCA)-part of the Superior National Forest-
until the Forest Service completed an EIS.77 The defendants argued 
that because the logging operation was a result of pre-NEPA timber 
sales, no major federal action occurred since NEPA became effective 
and thus NEPA could not apply to the logging operation through 
retroactive application.78 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit disagreed and in requiring an EIS,79 adopted the uni-
tary standard.8O 
In adopting the unitary standard, the court reasoned that the dual 
standard would not foster the purpose of NEPA.81 Indeed, the court 
reasoned that under a dual standard of analysis, it would be possible 
to speak of a "minor" federal action significantly affecting the quality 
of the human environment and to hold that NEPA would not be 
applicable to such an action.82 Such a result would defeat one of the 
71 NAACP, 584 F.2d at 625. 
72 Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir.), cm. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972). 
73 Scherr v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1027, 103~3 (7th Cir. 1972). 
74 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18. 
75 See MANDELKER, supra note 4, § 8.06(2). 
76 See, e.g., City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673 n.15 (9th Cir. 1975); Minnesota Pub. 
Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1974). 
77 Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 498 F.2d at 1317. 
78Id. at 1317, 1318. 
79 Id. at 1323. 
8°Id. at 1321-22. 
81Id. 
82 Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 498 F.2d at 1321-22. 
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primary purposes of NEPA-to prevent a federal agency from isolat-
ing a project from the project's impact on the environment.83 In this 
case, the logging activity would significantly affect the quality of the 
human environment.84 In addition, a federal agency-the Forest Serv-
ice-participated in the timber sales subsequent to NEPA's effective 
date.85 Therefore, the court used the unitary standard to require the 
Forest Service to prepare an EIS.86 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also 
adopted the unitary approach in City of Davis v. Coleman.87 In City 
of Davis, a federal agency had supplied funding for a joint state and 
federal project to build a freeway interchange.88 Opponents of the 
project argued that the Federal Highway Administration should pre-
pare an EIS.89 The United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' NEPA claims, reasoning 
that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the claims.90 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the 
district court's decision, ruling that the plaintiffs did have standing, 
and considered the plaintiffs' NEPA claims.91 Quoting the language in 
Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. Butz, where the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the 
unitary standard would foster the purposes of NEPA, the court in 
City of Davis decided to review the case using a unitary standard.92 
Thus, because the project may have had significant environmental 
effects, the court considered the action to be "major." Therefore, the 
court required the agency to prepare an EIS.93 
The unitary approach apparently does not require a court to assess 
how "major" the federal involvement in the project is, as long as the 
project significantly affects the quality of the human environment. 
Indeed, under the unitary approach, the statute could be rewritten to 
say "every federal action significantly affecting the quality of the 
83 [d. at 1322. 
84 [d. 
85 [d. 
86 [d. at 1323. 
87 City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673 n.15 (9th Cir. 1975). 
88 [d. at 665-66. 
89 [d. at 666. 
00 [d. 
91 See id. at 671, 673. 
92 City of Davis, 521 F.2d at 673, n.15; see also Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group v. 
Butz, 498 F.2d 1314, 1321-22 (8th Cir. 1974). 
93 City of Davis, 521 F.2d at 677. 
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human environment."94 Thus, the decision to use a unitary standard 
of analysis instead of a dual standard of analysis seems to solve the 
small-handle problem. Jurisdictions adopting a unitary standard prob-
ably would require a comprehensive EIS when confronted with a 
small-handle problem while jurisdictions adopting a dual standard of 
analysis, when similarly confronted, would not require an EIS. Be-
cause the CEQ regulations now explicitly adopt a unitary standard of 
analysis, courts presently considering a small-handle problem would 
be likely to utilize the unitary standard and require a comprehensive 
EIS.95 
B. The Second Judicial Approach: Whether or 
Not a Project Has Been "Federalized" 
Although application of the more prevalent unitary analysis to 
small-handle problems should lead to requiring an EIS, most courts-
even courts using a unitary analysis-have asked first whether the 
federal action in the project is sufficient to "federalize" the entire 
project.96 
Courts asking whether a project has been sufficiently "federalized" 
interpret NEPA as having a separate and identifiable statutory re-
quirement that an action be federal. 97 Under this analysis, a federal 
agency may be involved in a project without preparing an EIS. The 
threshold inquiry, however, is whether the federal participation is so 
significant to the project as a whole-including the nonfederal pieces 
of the project-to "federalize" the whole project. Only if the project 
as a whole has been "federalized" must the court determine whether 
the action is major or significant, depending on the jurisdiction's adop-
tion of a unitary or dual standard of analysis.98 
Courts that consider federalization as a separate threshold question 
reason that an EIS is necessary only if the federal agency has taken 
an action authorizing a nonfederal entity to undertake a project.99 
Courts reason that a project with both federal and nonfederal parts 
can become entirely federalized when the federal agency has enabled 
the nonfederal entity to act.I00 
94 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
95 See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. 
96 See infra notes 104--84 and accompanying text. 
97 MANDELKER, supra note 4, § 8.04. 
98 See id. § 8.06. 
99 See id. § 8.04(2). 
l°OId. 
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A project is clearly federalized when the nonfederal portions of the 
project require federal action before legally going forward. 101 Although 
federal action legally authorizing a project is sufficient to federalize a 
project, such legal authorization is not necessary to federalize a pro-
ject.102 Whether a project has been sufficiently "federalized" is less 
clear, however, when the federal action is not a legal requirement for 
the project, but the federal agency arguably has de facto control over 
the fate of a project so that opponents of the project can argue, in 
good faith, that the project will not go forward without agency ap-
prova1.103 
In the context of small-handle problems, courts have utilized differ-
ent standards to determine whether federal action which does not 
provide the legal authorization to a project but which does facilitate 
nonfederal action is sufficient to federalize the entire project.104 Al-
though the language that courts use to describe the different stand-
ards varies, all of these tests essentially examine, in varying degrees, 
the nexus between the federal and nonfederal pieces of a project.105 
Some courts purport to focus on whether parts of the project are 
interdependent or merely serve complementary functions. 106 Other 
courts focus on whether the federal agency has sufficient "but-for" 
factual control over the project.107 More recently, courts have ex-
pressed the idea that the nexus between the federal and nonfederal 
101 See, e.g., Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412, 418 (2d Cir.), 
em. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972) (action at issue was construction of high voltage electrical 
transmission line that required federal construction permit under § 4(c) of the Federal Power Act). 
102 Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 272 (8th Cir.), em. denied, 449 U.S. 836 
(1980) (noting that statute at issue-§ 10 of the Clean Water Act-could not be construed as a 
grant of legal control over entire project); Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States Corps of Engi-
neers, 610 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir.), em. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980) (noting that court was not 
holding that requisite federal action must be condition precedent to private action in order for 
preparation of EIS to be required). 
108 See, e.g., Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, 621 F.2d at 272; Save the Bay, 610 F.2d at 327; 
Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1428 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
104 A respected NEPA commentator has approved of making the threshold inquiry whether 
or not the federal involvement has federalized the entire project. See MANDELKER, supra note 
4, § 8.04(2). Because the various tests utilized by different courts are similar, Professor Man-
delker has described the approach taken by most courts in determining whether or not the 
project has been sufficiently federalized as a "substantial contribution" rule, requiring that the 
federal agency make a substantial contribution to the action to be carried out by the nonfederal 
entity. [d. According to Professor Mandelker, marginal federal involvement in a project is not 
sufficient to bring the project within the scope of NEPA. [d. 
100 See infra notes 109-84 and accompanying text. 
106 See Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363, 1372 (9th Cir. 1985). 
107 See Save the Bay, 610 F.2d at 327. 
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pieces of a project must be sufficient so that the pieces constitute 
"links-in-the same bit of chain."l08 Each of these courts have ignored 
the unitary standard of analysis as a way of resolving small-handle 
problems, even though many other courts and the CEQ regulations 
have adopted the unitary standard. 
1. Whether the Parts of a Project are Interdependent or Merely 
Serve Complementary Functions 
When confronted with a small-handle problem, some courts have 
considered whether the part of the project not requiring a federal 
permit is dependent on the part of the project that does require a 
federal permit. If the parts of the project are interdependent, rather 
than merely complementary, a comprehensive EIS will be required.109 
For example, in Port of Astoria v. Hodel, a private corporation sought 
to build an aluminum reduction plant. no The Bonneville Power Ad-
ministration, a federal agency, contracted to supply power to the 
project.lll Therefore, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit held that because the federal agency enabled the pri-
vate portion of the project to take place, the private portion of the 
project and the federal agency's contributions were interdependent.ll2 
Thus, the entire project was sufficiently federalized, and the court 
required a comprehensive EIS that considered both the plant and the 
power lines that were to supply the power.ll3 
If the part of the project that requires a federal permit and the part 
of the project that does not require a federal permit merely serve 
complementary functions, the agency will not have to prepare an EIS 
considering the project in its entirety,u4 For example, in Enos v. 
Marsh, Congress had authorized the construction of a deep draft 
harbor,u5 The Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) prepared an EIS,u6 
Plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of the EIS, arguing that the Corps 
had violated NEPA by failing to discuss the environmental effects of 
108 Sylvester v. United States Anny Corps of Engineers, 884 F.2d 394, 400 (9th Cir. 1989); see 
Ringsred v. Duluth, 828 F.2d 1305, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987). 
109 See Port of Astoria v. Hodel, 595 F.2d 467, 477 (9th Cir. 1979); Sierra Club v. Hodel, 544 
F.2d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1976). 
110 Port of Astoria, 595 F.2d at 47l. 
111 Id. 
112Id. at 477. 
113Id. 
114 See Enos v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 1363, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1985). 
115 I d. at 1366. 
116Id. 
1996] SMALL-HANDLE IMPACT STATEMENTS 451 
state-planned shoreside facilities that would be built because of the 
harbor project.ll7 The plaintiffs argued that the shoreside facilities 
were so "functionally interdependent" that the project constituted a 
single federal action.ns The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, however, ruled that although the deep harbor and the 
shoreside facilities served complementary functions, the two projects 
were distinct.119 As a result, the court concluded that the construction 
of the facilities was not a "federal" action that had to be considered 
in an EIS.120 Such a result, however, ignored the inevitable environ-
mental effects of the shoreside facilities attendant to the deep harbor 
project. 
2. The "But-For" Test 
The "but-for" test utilized by some courts to determine whether a 
project has been sufficiently federalized also considers the nexus be-
tween the nonfederal and federal portions of the project.121 Only if the 
federal portion of the project is sufficiently critical to the nonfederal 
portion of the project would the nexus between the two be sufficient 
to federalize the entire project.l22 If a court utilizing the but-for test 
does not deem a federal portion of the project sufficiently critical to 
the nonfederal portion of the project, the court does not require a 
comprehensive EIS.123 The United States Courts of Appeals for the 
Fifth and Eighth Circuits used a but-for analysis to determine whether 
or not projects were sufficiently federalized, even though both of 
those jurisdictions earlier had adopted the unitary standard.l24 In 
Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, the Nebraska Public Power 
District planned to construct a power line that would cross the Mis-
souri River and run through the Winnebago Indian Reservation.125 
Because the power line would cross the Missouri River, a permit from 
117 [d. at 1371. 
118 [d. 
119 Enos, 769 F.2d at 1371. 
120 [d. at 1372. The court also noted that the shoreside facilities were completely state funded 
and the federal government exercised no control over the planning and developing of the 
facilities. [d. 
121 See Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 272 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 
836 (1980); Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 610 F.2d 322, 327 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980). 
122 See, e.g., Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, 621 F.2d at 272-73; Save the Bay, 610 F.2d at 326-27. 
123 See, e.g., Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, 621 F.2d at 273; Save the Bay, 610 F.2d at 326-27. 
124 Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, 621 F.2d at 272. 
125 [d. at 270. 
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the Corps was required.126 The Corps concluded that an EIS was not 
required, although plaintiffs argued that the Corps should have con-
sidered the impact of the entire transmission line.127 In determining 
whether or not the Corps had but-for factual control requiring pro-
ject-wide analysis, the Eighth Circuit adopted a three-pronged test.l28 
In this test, the court considered: 
(1) the degree of discretion exercised by the agency over the 
federal portion of the project; (2) whether the federal government 
had given any direct financial aid to the project; and (3) whether 
the overall federal involvement with the project was sufficient to 
turn essentially private action into federal action.l29 
Applying this three-pronged test, the court concluded that no EIS 
was required.l30 First, the court noted that the Corps had no discre-
tion outside of its authority, which was limited to areas in and affect-
ing navigable waters.131 In addition, the court noted that there was no 
federal funding for the project.l32 Finally, giving no reasons, the court 
held that the fact that part of the line crossed the Missouri River did 
not turn the private action into federal action.1ss The court thus con-
cluded that the Corps did not have to consider the environmental 
impact of the entire transmission line.l34 Interestingly, however, in 
adopting the three-pronged but-for test, the court cited NAACP v. 
Medical Center, Inc. as precedent.135 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit in NAACP utilized a similar three-
pronged test after concluding that the dual standard of analysis was 
appropriate, a standard that has been rejected by the CEQ regula-
tions.136 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit also 
used the three-pronged but-for approach in the 1987 case of Ringsred 
v. Duluth.137 In Ringsred, a Native American group had purchased a 
126 [d. 
127 [d. at 270, 272. 
128 [d. at 272. 
129 Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, 621 F.2d at 272. 
130 [d. at 273. 
131 [d. at 272. The Tribe argued that the Corps's amended regulations made the grant of a § 10 
permit a per se major federal action. [d. 
132 [d. at 273. 
133 [d. 
134 Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, 621 F.2d at 273. 
136 [d. at 272-73. 
136 NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 584 F.2d 619, 627, 629 (3d Cir. 1978); see also supra note 
74 and accompanying text. 
137 Ringsred v. Duluth, 828 F.2d 1305, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987). 
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building and then transferred the building to the United States to be 
held in trust and made part of an Indian reservation.l38 The group 
converted the building into a gaming facility and leased the building 
to a commission established by the City of Duluth and the groUp.l39 
The City of Duluth had purchased land next to the gaming facility in 
order to build a parking ramp that would be leased to the commis-
sion.l40 When the land was transferred to the United States, the 
Secretary of the Interior issued an EA which concluded that actions 
regarding the gaming facility would not have a significant impact on 
the environment.l4l Opponents of the project argued that the pro-
posed parking ramp should have been considered when the Secretary 
of the Interior prepared an EA regarding the acquisition of the build-
ing.l42 The court, however, concluded that although the Secretary of 
the Interior had factual veto power over the proposed parking ramp, 
that action was not significant enough to establish major federal ac-
tion.l43 While the Secretary of the Interior had approved a contract 
concerning the ramp, the court noted that the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs did not consider such approval necessary.l44 In addition, the 
federal government provided no money to the project.l45 Thus, the 
court concluded that the Secretary's approval of the contracts did not 
federalize the entire project, and no EIS considering the impact of the 
parking ramp was required.l46 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also 
seemed receptive to adopting a but-for test in Save the Bay, Inc. v. 
United States Army Corps of Engineers. l47 In Save the Bay, develop-
ers sought to build a manufacturing facility.l48 The developers sought 
a permit to construct a pipe that would carry wastewater from the 
manufacturing facility and discharge wastewater into marshlands and 
the Bay of St. Louis.l49 The Corps determined that only the pipe was 
subject to its jurisdiction, prepared a statement of finding regarding 
138 [d. at 1306. 
139 [d. 
140 [d. 
141 [d. at 1307. 
142 Ringsred, 828 F.2d at 1307. 
143 [d. at 1308. 
144 [d. 
145 [d. 
146 [d. 
147 610 F.2d 322 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980). 
148 [d. at 323. 
149 [d. at 323-24. 
-------------
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the impact of the pipe, and issued a permit to the developer.l50 Oppo-
nents of the project, however, protested that the Corps's findings 
should consider the impact of the manufacturing facility as well as 
that of the pipe and argued that but-for the pipe to carry the waste-
water, the project could not go forward. 151 The opponents thus argued 
that the entire project should be taken into account in assessing 
potential environmental impacts.l52 The Fifth Circuit, disagreeing with 
the project opponents' interpretation of a but-for test, stated that the 
pipeline itself was not critical to the operation of the plant.l53 Indeed, 
the Fifth Circuit reasoned that for a federal portion of a project to be 
critical to the nonfederal portion of a project, a developer must be 
unable to use alternative technologies that could circumvent the need 
for a federal permit.l54 In this case, the court believed that at least one 
method other than a pipeline could be used to transport the wastewa-
ter.1S5 The court went on to state that more federal involvement than 
the mere issuance of the permit must exist in order to require a 
comprehensive EIS in this case.156 Indeed, the mere issuance of a 
permit was an insufficient nexus between the Corps and the construc-
tion of the plant to federalize the whole project.157 
3. "Links-in-the Same Bit of Chain" 
Apparently agreeing with the decisions in Save the Bay,l58 Winne-
bago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray/59 and Ringsred v. Duluth/60 in 1984 
the Corps amended its internal regulations to adopt officially a test 
similar to the but-for analysis that the Corps would apply to deter-
mine whether a project had been sufficiently federalized.161 The new 
regulations limited the scope of the Corps's jurisdiction to the feder-
160 [d. at 324. 
151 [d. at 327. 
152 Save the Bay, 610 F.2d at 327. 
153 [d. 
154 See id. 
155 [d. 
156 [d. 
157 Save the Bay, 610 F.2d at 327. 
158 [d. 
159 621 F.2d 269, 273 (8th Cir.), em. denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980). 
160 828 F.2d 1305, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987). 
161 See Sylvester v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 884 F.2d 394, 398 (9th Cir. 1989); 
see also Ellis & Smith, supra note 22, at 10,061. Under the Clean Air Act, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) must approve all proposed changes to the internal regulations of the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers. See 42 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (1988). However, because the 
EPA administrator did not approve of the changes, the changes were referred to the CEQ, 
which approved the new regulations. Sylvester, 884 F.2d at 398. 
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ally controlled or regulated aspects of whole projects.162 Indeed, the 
new regulations separated the private aspects of a project from the 
federal aspect of a project in most cases when a Corps's permit was 
needed only for a portion of the project.163 
The Corps's new regulations were challenged in Sylvester v. United 
States Army Corps of Engineers. l64 In upholding the new regulations, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted the 
"links-in-the same bit of chain" method of analysis to determine whether 
a project has been sufficiently federalized. 165 In Sylvester, a developer 
planned to build a resort complex including a resort village, skiing 
facilities, and a golf course.166 The developer planned to build the golf 
course on a meadow that included eleven acres of wetlands.167 Because 
the developer would have to fill in the wetlands to build the golf 
course, a permit from the Corps was necessary.168 The Corps believed 
that it only possessed jurisdiction over the wetlands, and therefore 
considered only the impact of filling in the wetlands.169 After imposing 
several conditions on the developer, the Corps issued the permit and 
an EA, concluding that an EIS was unnecessary.170 The plaintiffs 
sought an injunction, arguing that the golf course and the resort 
complex were connected actions. The plaintiffs argued that the Corps 
had unduly narrowed the scope of inquiry to the golf course alone, 
rather than assessing the entire resort complex.l7l 
162 Sylvester, 884 F.2d at 398. 
163 Ellis & Smith, supra note 22, at 10,061. The new regulations required that a district 
engineer establish the scope of an EA or the EIS, and address the impact of portions of the 
project over which the district engineer has "sufficient control and responsibility to warrant 
Federal review." In determining whether sufficient "control and responsibility" exists, the 
Corps's regulations directed that the district engineer consider: 
(i) [Wlhether or not the regulated activity comprises "merely a link" in a corridor type 
project (e.g., a transportation or utility transmission project). 
(ii) [Wlhether there are aspects of the upland facility in the immediate vicinity of the 
regulated activity which affect the location and configuration of the regulated activity. 
(iii) [Tlhe extent to which the entire project will be within Corps jurisdiction. 
(iv) [Tlhe extent of cumulative Federal control and responsibility. 
Sylvester,884 F.2d at 398-99, quoting 53 Fed. Reg. 3120, 3135 (1988) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. 
§ 325). 
164 See Sylvester, 884 F.2d at 399-400. 
165 See id. at 399, 40l. 
166 I d. at 396. 
167Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Sylvester, 884 F.2d at 396. 
170Id. at 396-97. 
171 Id. at 397. 
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In reviewing the Corps's decision, the court upheld the Corps's 
regulations and adopted the "links-in-the same bit of chain" analysis 
suggested by the Corps's new regulations.172 The court noted that 
unless the regulations interpreting NEPA were contrary to the ex-
press intent of Congress, the court must defer to the agency's inter-
pretation of NEPA.l73 In response to the argument that the Corps's 
regulations were contrary to the broad mandate of NEPA, the court 
stated that even expansive language has some limits.174 Moreover, the 
court stated that NEPA did not specify the scope of analysis that 
federal agencies must use in determining whether actions that require 
agency approval, when combined with private actions, fall within NEP A's 
requirements.175 In addition, the court rejected the argument that the 
Corps's regulations conflicted with CEQ regulations which provide 
that an agency cannot break down an action into smaller parts to 
avoid the EIS requirement.176 In rejecting this argument, the court 
employed the "links-in-the same bit of chain" method of analysis 
suggested in the Corps's regulations to determine whether the devel-
opment project had been sufficiently federalized.177 
To explain the "links-in-the same bit of chain" analysis, the court 
analogized to "scattered bits of broken chain."178 Continuing with the 
analogy, the court noted that "[s]ome segments ... contain numerous 
links, while other segments have only one or two [links]. Each seg-
ment stands alone, but each link within each segment does not."179 
Links in the same segment would be connected actions, and thus a 
court would require a comprehensive EIS.l80 Different segments, how-
ever, would stand alone, and a court would not require a comprehen-
sive EIS.181 Links would be considered parts of the same segment if 
one link could not exist without the other.l82 Applying this analysis to 
the case at hand, the court held that the golf course and the rest of 
the resort were not two links of the same segment of chain because 
172 [d. at 400. 
173 [d. at 399. 
174 Sylvester, 884 F.2d at 399. 
175 [d. 
176 [d. at 400. 
177 [d. 
178 [d. 
179 Sylvester, 884 F.2d at 400. 
180 See id. 
181 See id. 
182 See id. 
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other resort developments existed without golf courses.l83 Thus, the 
court ruled that the need for a permit did not "federalize" the entire 
project and the court did not require a comprehensive EIS.I84 
IV. FULFILLING NEP A's GOALS: REQUIRING A 
COMPREHENSIVE EIS 
NEPA established broad national policy goals and NEPA's legisla-
tive history and the CEQ regulations indicate that NEPA should 
require comprehensive EISs in the context of small-handle problems 
in order for these policy goals to be fulfilled.185 Requiring a compre-
hensive EIS for small-handle problems fulfills NEPA's goals by forc-
ing agencies to consider the environmental impacts of their projects.l86 
In addition, requiring a comprehensive EIS for small-handle problems 
protects the integrity of the decision-making process.187 These goals 
of NEPA can be achieved either by utilizing the unitary standard of 
analysis when confronted with a small-handle problem or by utilizing 
theories of indirect effects. 
A. Against the Trend: Two Cases that Required 
a Comprehensive EIS 
Despite the goals envisioned by Congress when Congress passed 
NEPA/88 the current judicial trend apparently rejects use of a small 
handle to require an EIS for an entire project. The environmental 
effects of these projects, however, may be significant. For example, 
in Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, the plaintiffs argued that 
power lines could do substantial harm to bald eagles, a species pro-
183 Id. 
184 Sylvester, 884 F.2d at 401. 
186 See supra notes 11-47 and accompanying text. Commentators have split on the approach 
that courts should take when confronted with the small-handle problem. Some commentators 
have noted that to interpret NEPA broadly would overstep the legislation. Ellis & Smith, supra 
note 22, at 10,058, 10,061; David J. Hayes & James A. Hourihan, NEPA Requirements for 
Private Projects, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 61, 63 (1985). A respected professor has written 
that Congress intended NEPA to be a "toothless tiger," with few substantive requirements. 
PLATER, supra note 3, at 599. Other commentators have argued that only by requiring compre-
hensive EISs can NEPNs statutory mandate be fulfilled. Patrick A. Parenteau, Small Handles, 
Big Impacts: When Do Corps Permits Federalize Private Development?, 20 ENVTL. L. 747, 
756 (1990); Thatcher, supra note 11, at 612-13. 
186 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
187 See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. 
188 See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text. 
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tected under the Endangered Species Act.189 In Save the Bay, Inc. v. 
United States Army Corps of Engineers, a pipeline was to carry 
approximately two million gallons per day of industrial wastewater to 
the Bay of St. Louis.190 
In light of both NEPA's goals and the significant environmental 
impacts of small-handle projects, two courts have required a compre-
hensive EIS when confronted with a small-handle problem. l9l One 
court that required a comprehensive EIS returned to the unitary/dual 
standard of analysis debate that other courts seemed to have dis-
missed as irrelevant.l92 Another court that required a comprehensive 
E IS considered the effects of the nonfederal portion of the project as 
secondary effects of the federal action that must be considered in an 
EIS.193 
1. Against the Trend: Using the Unitary Standard to Require a 
Comprehensive EIS 
Although most courts implicitly have rejected the unitary standard 
of analysis when confronted with a small-handle problem, utilizing the 
unitary approach is a logical way of analyzing a small-handle prob-
lem.l94 The United States District Court for the Central District of 
California resolved the small-handle problem by focusing on the uni-
tary/dual standard debate.1OO In Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 
developers planned to build a 156-acre residential and commercial 
development on the west side of the Colorado River.l96 Because the 
development was to run along the west side of the Colorado River, 
the developers proposed to stabilize the west shore of the Colorado 
River by placing riprap197 along the riverbank.l98 The developers had 
to obtain a permit from the Corps in order to stabilize the river 
189 Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 274 (8th Cir.), em. denied, 449 U.S. 836 
(1980). 
190 Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 610 F.2d 322, 323-24 (5th 
Cir.), eert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980). 
191 Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 881-82 (1st Cir. 1985); Colorado River Indian Tribes v. 
Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1431 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
192 Colorado River Indian Tribes, 605 F. Supp. at 1431-32. 
193 Sierra Club, 769 F.2d at 881-82. 
194 See infra notes 215-27 and accompanying text. 
195 Colorado River Indian Tribes, 605 F. Supp. at 1431. 
196 Id. at 1428. 
197 Riprap is broken stones loosely assembled in water or on soft ground as a foundation. 
198 Colorado River Indian Tribes, 605 F. Supp. at 1431. 
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bank.l99 Without the permit, the local county board would not approve 
the development.2OO The Corps reasoned that the scope of its jurisdic-
tion was limited to the river and its banks.201 Thus, even though the 
Corps had prepared a draft EIS, the Corps retracted the draft EIS 
and decided that it did not have to prepare an EIS.202 
In resolving the small-handle problem, the court did not look first 
at whether the need for the permit for the riprap federalized the 
entire project.203 Clearly, there existed federal involvement in a por-
tion of the project.204 Instead of analyzing whether federal involve-
ment federalized the whole project,205 the court noted that because 
the project involved federal action and the project as a whole had 
significant impacts, the unitary standard was appropriate and the 
project required an EIS.206 
The court began its analysis by considering the unitary approach 
utilized in City of Davis v. Coleman.207 In addition, the court opined 
that the rulings in Save the Bay, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of 
Engineers and Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray conflicted with 
courts which had adopted the unitary approach.206 Moreover, in utiliz-
ing the unitary standard of analysis to resolve the small-handle prob-
lem, the court looked at the CEQ regulations and NEPA's purpose.209 
Under a unitary approach to NEPA, the term "major Federal action" 
is not independent from the element of "significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment."21o The court reasoned that this 
approach was supported by the CEQ regulations which define "major 
Federal actions" to include "actions with effects that may be major 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. at 1432. 
202 I d. at 1428. 
203 See Colorado River Indian Tribes, 605 F. Supp. at 1430-31. 
204 That there must be some federal involvement in the project is not disputed. Two commen-
tators reason that there are two reasons why Congress intended NEPA to apply only to federal 
actions. The first reason is that NEPA was followed by a series oflaws establishing comprehen-
sive environmental regulatory programs which were targeted at the private sector. Secondly, 
the commentators reason that the procedures mandated by NEPA are not workable for decen-
tralized decision-making structures like the federal government. Ellis & Smith, supra note 22, 
at 10,056. 
205 See Colorado River Indian Tribes, 605 F. Supp. at 1431. 
206 See id. at 1430-32. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 1431-32. 
210 See supra note 74 and accompanying text; see also Colorado River Indian Tribes, 605 F. 
Supp. at 1431. 
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and which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibil-
ity" and stated that "[m]ajor reinforces but does not have a meaning 
independent of significantly."211 
In addition to returning to the unitary standard because of the CEQ 
regulations, the Colorado court emphasized NEPA's purpose.212 The 
court noted that: 
[t]o limit the scope to only 'major' federal involvement, ignoring 
the potential for significant impact, seems incongruous to the 
avowed intent of NEPA to maintain environmental quality. It is 
not the degree of federal involvement that influences the standard 
of living of our society, but instead the potential and degree of 
impact from development that bears upon the overall welfare and 
enjoyment of our society.213 
As a result of this reasoning, the court returned to the unitary standard 
as a way of analyzing a small-handle problem. Because the court had 
adopted the unitary standard, and thus focused its review of the 
agency's decision on whether the agency reasonably could have con-
cluded that the entire project would have no significant environmental 
impact, the court held that the EIS should consider the whole project.214 
The Colorado River Indian Tribes court addressed logically the 
small-handle problem because the court forced decisionmakers to con-
front the reasonably foreseeable environmental consequences of their 
actions. In contrast, most courts first would inquire whether federal 
involvement has federalized an entire project.215 Only if federal involve-
ment federalized an entire project would a court consider whether the 
federal involvement was major or if the impact of the project was 
significant.216 Intuitively, however, if there is enough federal involve-
ment to federalize a whole project, the federal action would be major. 
Thus, requiring federalization as a separate identifiable statutory 
question is essentially redundant to testing whether the federal in-
volvement in the project is "major."217 Courts considering whether an 
action is major instead should follow the reasoning of courts that have 
debated a unitary standard or a dual standard and chosen the unitary 
211 Colorado River Indian Tribes, 605 F. Supp. at 1431 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (1984». 
212Id. at 1431-32. 
213Id. at 1432. 
214Id. at 1433. 
215 See supra notes 97-183 and accompanying text (discussing various tests courts use to 
determine whether a project has been federalized). 
216 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 
217 MANDELKER, supra note 4, § 8.04(1). Mandelker also notes that this close relationship 
between a decision on whether an action is "federal" and a decision on "major" makes decisions 
that concentrate exclusively on the "federal" requirement hard to find. Id. 
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standard.218 Given that the CEQ regulations have adopted the unitary 
standard219 and that only use of a unitary standard fulfills NEP A's 
goals,220 courts should return to using the unitary standard when 
confronted with a small-handle problem. 
The wood-chipping installation hypothetical illustrates how illogical 
the approach currently taken by courts can be.221 A court faced with 
this hypothetical would ask whether the permit for the barge-loading 
facility was sufficient to federalize the entire project. Under the in-
terdependence test,222 a court could conclude that the wharf-building 
permit merely serves a complementary function to the wood-chipping 
installation. Under a but-for test,223 a court could conclude that, be-
cause there are other ways to remove the woodchips, the wharf-build-
ing permit is insufficient to federalize the entire project. Finally, 
utilizing the "links-in-the same bit of chain" analysis,224 a court could 
take judicial notice of the fact that other wood-chipping installations 
had gone forward without a barge-loading facility and conclude that 
the wood-chipping installation and the building permit were not "links-
in-the same bit of chain." Thus, although the impact of the project 
clearly would be significant, perhaps affecting the biological and cli-
matological character of major portions of several southern states, a 
court utilizing any of these approaches would avoid any further analy-
sis of the problem. In effect, a court could ignore the unitary standard 
completely, even though the CEQ regulations have explicitly adopted 
the unitary approach.225 
In contrast, a court following the reasoning of Colorado River Indian 
Tribes v. Marsh226 would note that the project involves federal action 
and the project's potential impacts are significant. Under the unitary 
standard that the CEQ regulations mandate, whether the federal 
involvement is arguably not major is irrelevant, and an EIS would be 
required.227 
218 See supra notes 194-214 and accompanying text (discussing Colorado River Indian Tribes 
v. Marsh, a case where the court utilized the unitary standard to require a comprehensive ErS). 
219 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
220 See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text (discussing NEPA's goals). 
221 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (presenting the wood-chipping hypothetical). 
222 See supra notes 109-20 and accompanying text (discussing the interdependence test). 
223 See supra notes 121-57 and accompanying text (discussing the but-for test). 
224 See supra notes 158-84 and accompanying text (discussing links-in-the-same-bit-of-chain 
analysis). 
225 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
226 605 F. Supp. 1425 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
227 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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Utilizing the unitary standard is preferable to the current trend by 
courts to make fact-specific inquiries about whether a project has 
been federalized from which no clear-cut guidance can be drawn.228 
Indeed, the fact-specific inquiry about whether a project has been 
federalized seems to be merely another way of utilizing the "dual 
standard" while rejecting cases that utilized a unitary standard.229 
Moreover, CEQ regulations provide agencies no guidance as to what 
constitutes "marginal" federal action. Rather, the CEQ notes that 
adoption of official policy, plans, or programs are categories into which 
federal actions tend to fall.230 In addition, the CEQ regulations state 
that federal action falls within the category of "[a]pproval of specific 
projects, such as construction or management activities located in a 
defined geographic area. Projects include actions approved by permit 
or other regulatory decision as well as federal and federally assisted 
activities."231 Finally, a court that considers whether a federal action 
is "major" rather than "minor" is, in essence, considering the degree 
of federal participation.232 The regulations make clear, however, that 
"major" is to have no meaning independent of the significant environ-
mental effects of a project.233 
2. Against the Trend: Using Theories of Indirect Effects to 
Require a Comprehensive EIS 
After returning to a unitary standard of analysis, the court in 
Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Marsh also examined the indirect 
effects of the project.234 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit, however, began its analysis of a small-handle problem 
in Sierra Club v. Marsh, by considering the indirect environmental 
effects of a project. In light of the indirect effects of the project that 
were reasonably foreseeable, the court required a comprehensive 
EIS.235 In Sierra Club, developers proposed to develop Sears Island, 
a 940-acre island in Penobscot Bay in Maine.236 A gravel bar that was 
228 See MANDELKER, supra note 4, § 8.06(2). 
229 See Colorado River Indian Tribes, 605 F. Supp. at 143l. 
230 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.18(b)(1)-(3). 
231Id. § 1508.18(b)(4). 
232 See MANDELKER, supra note 4, § 8.04(1). 
233 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
234 Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1433 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
235 Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 881--82 (1st Cir. 1985). 
236Id. at 872. 
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exposed only at low tide connected the island to the mainland.237 The 
mainland area had been developed for industrial use.238 The develop-
ers had plans in place to build both a causeway that would connect 
the island to the mainland and a cargo port that would be used to ship 
lumber and agricultural products.239 In addition, the Sears Island pro-
posal also included plans to develop an industrial park in the area 
adjacent to the cargo port.240 Building the port and causeway required 
permits from the Corps.241 The plans for the industrial park were not 
yet finalized,242 and the Corps prepared an EA that considered only 
the causeway and the cargo port.243 
Then-Judge, now Justice, Stephen Breyer, speaking for a majority 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, held that 
an EIS for the planned island development must encompass all three 
parts of the project.244 In holding that the EIS also must consider the 
environmental effects of the proposed industrial development, the 
court never concluded that the entire project had been federalized.245 
Rather, the court looked to the CEQ regulations, which require an 
agency to take account of "indirect effects" in preparing an EIS.246 An 
agency "need not consider highly speculative or indefinite impacts."247 
Because the proposed development of the industrial plant was part of 
an integrated plan with the causeway and port, however, the court 
found that the environmental effects of the industrial port were not 
merely speculative.248 In addition, the court pointed out that in the 
Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's NEPA Regulations, 
237 [d. 
238 [d. 
239 [d. 
240 Sierra Club, 769 F.2d at 872. 
241 See id. at 873. Presumably, the Corps's jurisdiction arose from the Clean Water Act. 
242 [d. at 872. 
243 [d. at 873. 
244 [d. at 881-82. 
245 See Sierra Club, 769 F.2d at 881-82. 
246 [d. at 877-78. See supra note 46 and accompanying text for the CEQ definition of "indirect 
effects." 
247 [d. at 878. 
248 [d. In holding that the building of the industrial park was not merely speculative, the court 
noted that the record made it impossible to doubt that building the causeway and port would 
lead to further development of the island. Local planners considered the port, causeway and 
industrial park to be components of an integrated plan. [d. Second, the plans were precise 
enough for an agency preparing an EIS to take them usefully into account. [d. at 879. Third, 
the court noted that once the causeway and port were completed, pressure to develop the rest 
of the island could prove irreversible. Thus, even if federal authorities would have an opportu-
nity to consider the impact of the industrial park at a later date, the decisionmaker would not 
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the CEQ stated that "[t]he agency can not ignore these uncertain, but 
probable, effects of its decision."249 
In addition to considering the CEQ regulations and the answers the 
CEQ promulgated to common questions, the Sierra Club court also 
looked at the purpose and spirit of NEPA.250 The court noted that 
requiring a comprehensive EIS "reflects NEPA's underlying purpose 
in requiring agencies to determine and assess environmental effects 
in a systematic way-namely, having decisionmakers focus on these 
effects when they make major decisions ... the requirement flows not 
only from the letter, but also from the spirit, of NEPA."251 Thus, it 
appears that the First Circuit, at least, has considered the legislative 
history of NEPA.252 
A NEPA commentator summarized the decision of the Sierra Club 
court as a decision based on causation theory.253 Under causation 
theory, reasonably foreseeable environmental effects of a project may 
be considered indirect effects for EA or EIS purposes when there is 
federal involvement in a project that will cause nonfederal conduct.254 
Furthermore, the commentator argued that what is beneficial about 
using this theory is that the theory both considers reasonably fore-
seeable environmental effects of a project and protects Congress's 
intent to limit NEPA to federal action.255 
Utilizing the indirect effects approach would eliminate the need to 
determine whether or not a project has been sufficiently federalized. 
'!\vo commentators noted that, as between determining whether or 
not a project has been federalized and considering the secondary or 
indirect effects of a project under a causation theory, the causation-
based theory is a better approach because this analysis more closely 
follows the NEPA statute, which seeks to regulate federal action that 
causes significant environmental impacts.256 Moreover, the causation-
based theory of indirect effects is consistent with the CEQ regula-
tions, which state that effects of a project may include effects related 
have a meaningful choice because of the parts of the project that had already been completed. 
See id. 
249 [d. (quoting Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental 
Policy Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,031 (1981». 
250 Sierra Club, 769 F.2d at 882. 
251 [d. 
252 See supra notes 7-14 and accompanying text. 
253 Ellis & Smith, supra note 22, at 10,058 n.29. 
254 [d. at 10,058. 
255 [d. 
256 [d. 
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to induced changes in the pattern of land use and related effects on 
air and water and other natural systems, including ecosystems.257 
Finally, the federalization requirement, because no clear-cut guide-
lines can be drawn from the fact-specific tests utilized by courts, 
"invites the government to intrude on private decisionmaking ... and 
to restrain ... private conduct over which the government has no 
authority."258 
Opponents of the projects in Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Ray 
and in Ringsred v. Duluth also argued that, even assuming limited 
federal involvement, the Corps nevertheless must consider the im-
pacts of nonfederal segments because those impacts were indirect 
effects of the proposed federal action.259 In both cases, the courts 
rejected this argument.260 A better presentation by the plaintiffs, 
however, might have changed the courts' final decisions.261 Merely 
contending that ''bigger is worse" was insufficient.262 Rather, oppo-
nents of a project must convince a court that something different or 
significant is occurring.263 In addition, in both cases the opponents of 
the projects presented the arguments as a backup, and appeared to 
focus more on the "federalization" requirement.264 Finally, for this 
approach to be successful, the timing must be correct.265 For example, 
in Ringsred, the court stated that the parking ramp project was only 
in the proposal stage.266 The court refused to hold that the Secretary 
should consider as an indirect impact the environmental effects of the 
parking ramp, reasoning that to do so would place too great a burden 
on the EA-screening process.267 In contrast, in Sierra Club, the plans 
for the third part of the project that the court required to be included 
in the EIS, although not final, were developed.268 
There are several reasons why using a theory of indirect effects is 
an important means of fulfilling NEP A's statutory mandate. The value 
257 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
258 Ellis & Smith, supra note 22, at 10,058. 
259 See Ringsred v. Duluth, 828 F.2d 1305, 1308-09 (8th Cir. 1987); Winnebago Tribe of N e-
braska v. Ray, 621 F.2d 269, 273 (8th Cir.), em. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (1980). 
260 Ringsred, 828 F.2d at 1308-09; Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, 621 F.2d at 273. 
261 Thatcher, supra note 11, at 639. 
262 See id. (discussing this idea in the context of theories of cumulative impacts). 
263 [d. 
264 [d. at 636. 
265 [d. at 636-37. 
266 Ringsred v. Duluth, 828 F.2d 1305, 1309 (8th Cir. 1987). 
267 [d. 
268 See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
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of using an analysis based upon indirect effects is that such an analysis 
acknowledges that proposed federal action causes indirect effects 
even though the federal government does not directly sponsor sub-
sequent activities.269 In addition, while with theories of cumulative 
impacts confusion often arises over whether subsequent nonfederal 
actions must already be proposed and whether impacts of federal and 
nonfederal actions are technically cumulative, such confusion is elimi-
nated under an analysis based upon indirect effects.27o Finally, a the-
ory of connected actions can result in the conclusion that two pieces 
of a project are not sufficiently connected, i.e. are not "links-in-the 
same bit of chain," and a comprehensive EIS is not required because 
each piece could exist without the other.271 A theory of indirect effects, 
however, forces the decisionmaker to confront the fact that future 
development with significant environmental impacts is reasonably 
foreseeable or likely to result if plans for the first piece of a project 
are approved. 
The wood-chipping hypothetical illustrates how a theory of indirect 
effects would work.272 Developers would need the Corps to issue a 
wharf-building permit in order to ship the wood chips. Developers will 
build the wood-chipping installation if the Corps issues a wharf-build-
ing permit. Building the wood-chipping installation will impact the 
environment, possibly affecting the biological and climatological char-
acter of major portions of several southern states. Even though the 
potential biological and climatological effects are later in time and 
farther removed from the construction of the project, the effects are 
reasonably foreseeable. The CEQ regulations state that the effects 
may include, as in this case, effects related to induced changes in the 
pattern of land use and related effects on air and water and other 
natural systems, including ecosystems.273 Thus, the Corps should pre-
pare an EIS that considers the effects of the wood-chipping installa-
tion on the environment. 
When confronted with a small-handle problem, most courts con-
sider whether a project with some federal involvement has been 
269 Thatcher, supra note 11, at 636. 
270 [d. Thatcher also notes that such a theory may change the result of a case such as Enos v. 
Marsh. 769 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1985). In Enos, the court never discussed a theory of indirect 
effects, and as a result reached a decision that was called "flatly wrong under NEPA." Thatcher, 
supra note 11, at 636-37. 
271 See supra notes 158-84 and accompanying text. 
272 See supra notes 234-58 and accompanying text. 
273 See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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sufficiently federalized to require a comprehensive EIS. By using 
either a unitary standard of analysis or a theory of indirect effects, 
courts could require a comprehensive EIS. The requirement of a 
comprehensive EIS in such circumstances is consistent with NEPA 
and the CEQ regulations, and clearly advances NEPA's policy goals. 
B. Requiring a Comprehensive EIS Protects the 
Integrity of the Decision-making Process 
Protecting the integrity of the decision-making process was clearly 
an important policy goal of NEPA.274 Only requiring a comprehensive 
EIS will protect the integrity of the decision-making process. For 
example, in Maryland Conservation Council v. Gilchrist, a county 
was planning a highway needed to relieve traffic congestion.275 Re-
gardless of the exact route of the highway, at some point the highway 
had to pass through a portion of a state park.276 With the county's 
authorization, private developers had begun to develop a route in the 
vicinity of the park that, if extended through the park, would take 
three times as much park land as the route preferred by environ-
mental groupS.277 Before the portion of the highway that was to pass 
through the park could be built, the Secretary of Interior would have 
to approve of the conversion of park land to uses other than public 
outdoor recreation.278 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit held that the highway project constituted major fed-
eral action that required an EIS.279 The court thus ruled that work on 
any portion of the project could not begin until the agency had pre-
pared an EIS.280 
In requiring that no work on the project could begin until the 
agency had completed an EIS, the court reasoned that federal deci-
sionmakers would be improperly influenced if segments of the project 
were completed before developers sought a permit for the portion of 
the project that crossed through the park.281 The court commented 
274 See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. 
275 Maryland Conservation Council, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 808 F.2d 1039, 1041 (4th Cir. 1986). 
276 [d. 
277 [d. 
278 [d. at 1042. The court also noted that it was likely that the Secretary of the Army would 
have to issue a permit to dredge wetlands when the portion of the highway that was to cross 
through the park was built. [d. 
279 [d. 
280 Gilchrist, 808 F.2d at 1042. 
281 See id. 
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that the completed segments would "stand like gun barrels pointing 
into the heartland of the park."282 The court stated that "[n]on-federal 
actors may not be permitted to evade NEPA by completing a project 
without an EIS and then presenting the responsible federal agency 
with a fait accompli."282 
The small-handle situation is slightly different from the situation 
faced by the court in Maryland Conservation. In Maryland Conser-
vation, the federal action was clearly major, while in the small-handle 
cases that very issue is in dispute. The court's reasoning in Maryland 
Conservation regarding why the other portions of the project must 
be considered, however, is applicable to small-handle cases. In both 
cases, nonfederal actors should not be able to complete major portions 
of projects and later seek a particular permit while presenting the 
decisionmakers with a "fait accompli."284 Indeed, in either situation, 
the nonfederal actor should be prevented from completing a major 
portion of the project and then seeking any necessary permits. Oth-
erwise, the federal decisionmaker might be unduly influenced by the 
fact that large portions of the project have been completed and may 
remain idle until and unless any necessary federal permits are issued. 
This argument becomes even more compelling when public opinion 
supports a project despite potentially significant effects on the environ-
ment. For example, in Sierra Club v. Marsh, popular opinion sup-
ported the development of the island.285 The development of the island 
was important to the economic growth of the area, and requiring an 
EIS that considered construction of an industrial plant would delay 
the project.286 The court in Sierra Club pointed out, however, that to 
refuse to consider a certain part of a project because of such concerns 
would be contrary to the very purpose of NEPA-to require federal 
agencies to consider such effects.287 
V. CONCLUSION 
NEPA's language and the CEQ regulations promulgated thereun-
der appear to require a comprehensive EIS in the context of the 
282 [d. 
283 [d. 
284 See id. 
286 See Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868, 872 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting that Maine voters had 
twice approved bonds to finance state's share of costs of project). 
286 [d. 
287 [d. at 881--82. 
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small-handle problem. Fact-specific inquiries that consider whether 
or not a project has been federalized have prevented any uniformity 
in judicial decisions on the necessity and scope of an EIS when con-
sidering small-handle problems. On the positive side, some courts 
have used the unitary standard or a theory of indirect effects to 
require a comprehensive EIS and have thereby fulfilled NEPA's goals. 
Ultimately, requiring a comprehensive EIS is the only means to en-
sure development and implementation of solutions to the problems 
that Congress first warned about in 1969. 
